We study a model of observational learning in a set of agents who are connected through a social network. The agents face identical decision problems under uncertainty and update their choices myopically, imitating the choice of their most successful neighbor. We show that in finite networks, regardless of the network structure, the population converges to a monomorphic steady state, i.e., one at which every agent chooses the same action, and it cannot be predicted which this action will be. In arbitrarily large networks with bounded neighborhoods, an action is diffused to the whole population either if it is the only one initially chosen by a non-negligible share of the population, or if the payoffs satisfy a sufficient condition. Without the assumption of bounded neighborhoods, (i) an action can survive even if only one agent chooses it initially, and (ii) there may exist steady states that are not monomorphic.
Introduction

Motivation
Social learning theory is a perspective that states that social behavior is learned primarily by observing (observational learning) and imitating the actions of others (see Ormrod 1999) . In our context, social learning describes the idea that economic agents' decisions are influenced by past experience of their neighbors. 1 We consider a problem of individual decision-making under uncertainty, where the agents are not aware of the relative profitability of their alternative choices. In this setting, we introduce a simple learning process with the following features: Agents observe in each period the choices of their neighbors and the payoffs those choices yield. Subsequently, they revise their choices repeatedly according to these observations. In particular, they do so by imitating the action that yielded the highest payoff within their neighborhood in the preceding period. We refer to this updating rule as "imitate-the-best" neighbor. 2 The aim of this paper is to analyze the long-run behavior of a population consisting of agents who behave as if they "imitate-their-best" neighbor.
Imitation of successful behavior has been studied extensively in several different disciplines. 3 In economics, recent empirical results suggest that people tend to imitate successful past behavior of their neighbors (see Apesteguia et al. 2007; Conley and Udry 2010; Bigoni and Fort 2013) . All these articles provide evidence that in several dynamic decision problems, the agents seem to behave as if they observe the actions of their neighbors, and they tend to imitate those who were the most successful in the recent past. There are several reasons that can justify this behavior. On the one hand, agents may not be aware of the mechanisms controlling the outcome of their choices, hence they need to experiment themselves or rely on past experience of those they can observe. On the other hand, in certain environments, Bayesian updating may require calculations that are beyond the computational capabilities of the agents, leading them to adopt simple learning heuristics.
There are several real environments that can be described by our setting. An example where our model fits particularly well is the diffusion of agricultural technologies. 4 It is reasonable to assume that farmers are able to observe the technologies used by their neighbors, as well as the output those technologies yield. Moreover, Conley and Udry (2010) provide evidence supporting the idea that farmers tend to adopt technologies which have performed extremely well in near past. Furthermore, the output of a production activity is subject to both aggregate and idiosyncratic stochastic shocks. On the one hand, aggregate shocks are related to the appropriateness of the weather for different crops and technologies. On the other hand, idiosyncratic shocks are related to the specific characteristics of the terrain of each farm, the efficient, or not, implementation of a given technology and several other factors of unobserved heterogeneity between farmers and their land. Notice that, our focus is on the output produced by a given technology and not on the profits this output generated. This fact allows us to disregard completely issues related to the market structure and competition among farmers. Therefore, it becomes reasonable to use a model without strategic interactions between farmers.
Another relevant example is the parents' decision about which school to send their children to; or their decision about whether to send them to a public school or a private one. It is apparent that the satisfaction of the parents by such a decision depends mainly on the characteristics of the school itself, rather than on the decisions of other parents. Nevertheless, it may be different between parents who made the same choice. It is also commonly observed that the parents decide relying mostly on other parents' previous experience. This happens mainly because of the difficulty lying on the identification of the real quality of each school. Furthermore, information received by those who had been extremely satisfied in the past tends to be more influential; observation that leads directly to our learning heuristic.
Preview of Results
Formally, we consider a countable population forming a social network (see Jackson 2008) . In each period, every agent chooses an action from a finite set of alternatives. Payoffs are uncertain and depend on the action chosen and on two uncertainty para meters. The first parameter is associated with an idiosyncratic shock that is independent across agents. The second parameter is associated with an aggregate shock that is common for all the agents who have chosen the same action and is independent across actions. All shocks are independent across periods and every action has strictly positive probability of yielding higher outcome than all the other actions. The agents are not aware of the underlying distributions of the uncertainty parameters and there are no strategic interactions between agents. In the example of diffusion of agricultural technologies this payoff structure is very intuitive. Output levels depend partially on aggregate stochastic shocks, mostly due to the weather, but they depend also on idiosyncratic shocks that capture differences in the soil and climate or even in the proper use of a technique. After making their own choice, all agents observe the chosen actions and realized payoffs of their direct neighbors. Subsequently, they update their choice, imitating myopically the action that yielded the highest payoff within her neighborhood in the preceding period.
We show that when the population is finite the network eventually converges with probability 1 to a monomorphic steady state, meaning that all the agents end up choosing the same action. However, we cannot guarantee which action will be the one the one to survive. This happens because each action is vulnerable to a sequence of negative shocks that can lead to its disappearance. We extend our analysis, introducing a standard form of experimentation, where with some probability agents choose randomly among the alternative actions, instead of imitating their most successful neighbor. Interestingly enough, despite the fact that experimentation allows the reappearance of actions that have disappeared, if the experimentation rate becomes arbitrarily small the process stays almost always in one of the monomorphic states. Moreover, for each one of the monomorphic states the probability of the process being in this state is strictly positive. This means that in the long run the process will spend a non-negligible amount of time in each one of the monomorphic states. Thus, we can say that the result is also robust to the standard form of experimentation.
Our result is shaped mainly by a combination of the two main ingredients of the model: the imitative behavior of the agents and the payoff structure. The finite population combined with the fact that each action may yield higher or lower payoff than its alternatives make any action vulnerable to disappearance after a sufficiently long sequence of negative shocks. This, in turn, means that is possible the contagion of a sub-optimal action. The possibility of convergence to a state where everyone chooses a sub-optimal action is a common issue in processes with stochastic payoffs (see for instance Bala and Goyal 1998; Gale and Kariv 2003) . However, the crucial difference is that in our process it is impossible to eliminate this possibility, due to the imitative behavior of the agents. The fact that the agents do not accumulate information regarding the underlying distributions of payoffs makes impossible the prediction of their long-run behavior.
Notice that this is impossible even under the presence of experimentation. This is in contrast to several of the models in which the agents interact strategically with their neighbors and where experimentation can ensure convergence to the efficient action (see for instance Ellison 1993; Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer 2008) . 5 The fact that a single mutation can generate a transition from one monomorphic state to another ensures that the process will spend a non-trivial amount of time at each one of its monomorphic states. In principle, for finite populations these results can be extended to other imitation rules, such as "imitate best average" (see Ellison and Fudenberg 1993) . 6 The results differ significantly when we let the population become arbitrarily large. First of all, without further restrictions we cannot ensure convergence to a monomorphic steady state. In fact, convergence depends on the payoffs' 5 In our setting we should be careful when referring to efficiency. Referring to an action by using the term efficient might be misleading, since we have not defined precisely the payoffs' distributions. For this reason, throughout the paper we use the term optimal, which will refer to an action being more probable to yield higher payoff than the alternative actions. 6 Where an agent chooses the action she observes to have yielded the highest average payoff in her neighborhood during the preceding period. distributions, on the network structure and in particular on whether or not the agents have bounded neighborhoods, i.e., whether there are agents who interact with a non-negligible share of the population. 7 The importance of neighborhoods being bounded arises in several models of local interactions and usually the existence of agents who can affect a large proportion of the population has a negative effect on long-run behavior of the population.
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Assuming bounded neighborhoods, we can ensure convergence to a monomorphic state if there is only one action chosen initially by a non-negligible share of the population. If this is not the case, then we provide a counter example, where a network never converges to a steady state. Nevertheless, we provide a sufficient condition on the payoff structure, which ensures convergence regardless of the network structure. This condition is more demanding than first order stochastic dominance, thus implying that in very large networks the diffusion of a single action is very hard to occur and it demands a very large proportion of initial adopters, or a special network structure, or an action to perform much better compared to all others. This is the only result where we are able to ensure convergence to a specific action. Our sufficient condition disregards completely the importance of the network architecture. The behavior of specific network structures would be a very interesting topic for further research.
Once we drop the assumption of neighborhoods being bounded, the properties of the network change significantly. In this case, an action may survive, even if only one agent chooses it initially. This happens because this one agent may affect the choice of a non-negligible share of the population; an observation that stresses the role of centrality in social networks. For instance, providing a technology or a product to a massively observed agent, can affect significantly the behavior of the population. Finally, we construct another example where a network is in steady state without this being monomorphic, which contrasts our result regarding networks with finite population. 9
Related Literature
Our work is in line with the literature on learning from neighbors (see Banerjee 1992; Fudenberg 1993, 1995; Bala and Goyal 1998; Gale and Kariv 7 By bounded neighborhood we mean that there exists K > 0 such that the number of neighbors of every agent i satisfies k i ≡|N i | ≤ K, ∀i ∈N. 8 See for instance Bala and Goyal (1998) and Golub and Jackson (2010) . Despite the fact that the settings are substantially different, the effect of such agents is evident. 9 Coexistence of several actions in the long-run has also been observed in other papers, as for instance in Ellison and Fudenberg (1993). 2003; Banerjee and Fudenberg 2004; Acemoglu et al. 2011) . Most of this literature has focused on the identification of conditions that ensure the contagion of efficient actions to the whole population, typically in settings without strategic interactions. A similar environment to ours is considered by Ellison and Fudenberg (1993) , where the agents choose repeatedly between two technologies and evaluate their choices periodically. The authors consider an "imitate-the-best-average" rule, rather than "imitate-the-best," and they focus exclusively on infinitely large populations, thus restricting the comparability of our results.
Of particular interest is the paper by Gale and Kariv (2003) , where the authors consider the same network and payoff structure as we do, but they assume that agents perform Bayesian updating on their potentially different initial beliefs.
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Updating is based on the observed choices and realized payoffs of their neighbors. Similarly to our results, they find that asymptotically all agents will converge to the adoption of the same action. However, they are able to ensure convergence to the optimal action under certain conditions, which in our setting is never possible for networks with finite population.
Nevertheless, the main focus of our paper is the feature of imitation of successful behavior. Large part of the literature on imitation in networks studies games played between neighbors and usually either versions of prisoner's dilemma or coordination games (see for instance Ellison 1993; Eshel et al. 1998; Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer 2008) . In particular, imitation of the most successful neighbor is studied by Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2008) in the context of a coordination game played by agents located on an arbitrary network. The main aim of these papers is either how to sustain cooperation or how to achieve coordination to the most efficient action. As we have already mentioned, this is something that can never be guaranteed in our case. This happens mainly due to the fact that in these models uncertainty arises from the lack of information about the choices of others. Disregarding that, the transition between action profiles occurs deterministically. This feature allows the characterization of conditions that ensure contagion to efficient action or sustain cooperation, using for instance results such as the ones in Ellison (2000) .
Imitative behavior is also discussed in several models of evolutionary game theory (see Weibull 1995; Fudenberg and Levine 1998) , where in fact imitation tends to be a particularly efficient form of behavior. More specifically, VegaRedondo (1997) shows that if a Cournot economy consists of agents who imitate the most successful agent they observe, then it is led to Walrasian equilibrium. Furthermore, Schlag (1998 Schlag ( , 1999 finds probabilistic imitation of successful agents to be the most efficient behavior when facing multi-armed bandits. The main difference between evolutionary and network models, is that agents are randomly matched with others from the population.
Finally, imitation has been studied extensively in several different disciplines, including Physics, Computer Science, Biology and Zoology. In particular, Nowak and May (1992) may be considered as one of the first papers developing the idea of imitating the most successful neighbor. Many of the papers in this literature (see for instance Nowak and May 1993; Abramson and Kuperman 2001; Nowak et al. 2004; Ohtsuki et al. 2006 ) study games played between neighbors and they focus mostly on the evolution of cooperation.
11 Environments without strategic interactions are considered in voter models (see Liggett 1985) and in general models of cellular automata. The difference is that, in the latter settings, imitation is not associated with successful past behavior of one's neighbor, but it rather describes a random choice among observed actions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain the model. In Section 3, we provide the main results for networks with finite population. While, in Section 4 we study networks with arbitrarily large population. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude and discuss possible extensions.
The Model
The Agents
There is a countable set of agents N, with cardinality n and typical elements i and j, mentioned as population of the network.
12 Each agent i ∈N takes an action t i a from a finite set A = {α 1 , …, α M }, at every period t = 1, 2, …. Each a ∈A yields a random payoff. Uncertainty is represented by a probability space (S, F, P), where S = Ω × Z is a product metric space, with Ω and Z being compact metric spaces 13 . F is the product Borel σ-algebra, and P is a product Borel probability measure.
There is a common stage payoff function U:A × Ω × Z→R, which consists of two components, U ID and U AC . The first component, U ID , is associated with an idiosyncratic shock, ω ∈Ω, which is realized every period independently for each agent and its distribution depends on the chosen action. The second component, U AC , is associated with an aggregate shock, z ∈Z, which in each period is common for all the agents who chose the same action in that period. Its realization is independent across actions and across periods. Given the meaning of the payoffs in the current setting, we can assume without problems the payoff function to be additively separable in these two components. Our results would be identical without this assumption and we impose it only because it facilitates the exposition of our results.
The payoff structure is similar to the ones used by Gale and Kariv (2003) and Ellison and Fudenberg (1993) . A simpler form of payoffs would lead to similar results, nevertheless with the current setting we are able to capture several realistic environments, such as the outcome of the adoption of different agricultural technologies. Formally, 
t. U(a, z) = x} are closed intervals in R.
14 We restrict our attention to cases where
Moreover, P has full support over Ω × Z. We denote by a ID F and a AC F the cumulative distribution functions of U ID and U AC , respectively, associated with action a. 15 This setting ensures that for each action there is positive probability to be the one to yield the highest outcome in each period.
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In each period t, the realized payoff of agent i ∈N who has chosen action t i a A ∈ is denoted by . ω being the realization of the idiosyncratic shock of player i and t i t a z being the shock associated to the action chosen by agent i, both at period t, we obtain the following expression:
14 Throughout the paper, U ID (a, Ω) is called the (common) support of the idiosyncratic component of the payoff function and likewise U AC (a, Z) is called the (common) support of the aggregate component of the payoff function. 15 Without the assumption of U being additively separable we would have to do exactly the same analysis but using the joint cumulative distribution functions. 16 The cases where an action is strictly payoff dominant are uninteresting, because it is trivial that the dominant action will spread to the whole population. In Section 3 we explain how this result would be affected by experimentation.
The Network
A social network is represented by a family of sets :
N N i n ⊆ = … N with N i denoting the set of agents observed by agent i. Throughout the paper N i is called i's neighborhood, and is assumed to contain i. 17 The sets N induce a graph G with nodes N, and edges =1 {( , ): }.
We focus on undirected graphs: as usual, we say that a network is undirected whenever for all i, j ∈N it is the case that j ∈N i if and only if i ∈N j . In the present setting, the network structure describes the channels of communication in the population and does not impose strategic interactions. More specifically, each agent i ∈N observes the action and the realized payoff of every j ∈N i .
A path in a network between nodes i and j is a sequence i 1 ,…, i K such that
The distance, l ij , between two nodes in the network is the length of the shortest path between them. The diameter of the network, denoted as d N , is the largest distance between any two nodes in the network. We say that two nodes are connected if there is a path between them. The network is connected if every pair of nodes is connected. We focus on connected networks, nevertheless for disconnected networks the analysis would be identical for each of their connected components. 
Behavior
In the initial period, t = 1, each agent is assigned, exogenously, to choose one of the available actions.
19 After each period, t = 2, 3, … the agents have the opportunity to revise their choices. Revisions happen simultaneously for all agents. We assume that each agent i ∈N can observe the choices and the realized payoffs of her neighbors in the previous period. According to these observations, she revises her choice by imitating the action of her neighbor who received the highest payoff in the previous period. Ties are broken randomly. 20 Formally, for t > 1, 17 This assumption is not usual, however in this setting it is necessary since N i describes the set of agents whose actions can be observed by i. Therefore, since it is reasonable to assume that one can observe her own actions, she should be contained in her own neighborhood. 18 A component is a non-empty sub-network N′ such that N′⊂N, N′ is connected and if i ∈N′ and (i, j) ∈E then j ∈N′ and (i, j) ∈E′. 19 We assume that every action in A is chosen initially by some agent. Without loss of generality we can exclude from the action space any action that is not chosen by any agent during the first period. 20 Ties arise with probability zero, because the agents are countably many, while the states of nature are uncountably many. 
where recall that by t k a we denote the action chosen by agent k in period t and by t j U the realized payoff of agent j in period t. We refer to this updating rule as "imitate-the-best" (see also Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer 2008) .
An important aspect of this myopic behavior is that the agents discard most of the available information. They ignore whatever happened before the previous round and even from this round they take into account only the piece of information related to the most successful agent. This naive behavior makes the network vulnerable to extreme shocks, which may be very misleading for the society.
Steady State and Efficiency
State of period t is called the vector ( , , )
of the actions chosen by each agent at this period, which belongs to the state space A n . We denote by { :
the subset of the action space, A, which contains those actions that are chosen by at least one agent in period t. Notice, that an action which disappears from the population at a given period, never reappears, hence A t ⊆A t-1 ⊆…⊆A 1 ⊆A. In a given period t, its state is called monomorphic if every agent chooses the same action, i.e., if there exists k ∈{1, …, M}, such that t i k a α = for all i ∈N. Also, the population is in steady state if no agent changes her action from this period on, i.e., if ( , , ) ( , , )
Throughout the paper, the idea of convergence refers to convergence with probability one. Finally, we call an action optimal if it is the most likely to yield the highest payoff compared to all the other actions. An action is better than another action if it more likely to yield higher payoff. An action is called sub-optimal if it is not better than all the other.
Networks with Finite Population
In this section, we restrict our attention to networks with finite population. We prove that finite networks always converge to a monomorphic steady state, regardless of the initial conditions and the network structure. Moreover, any action can be the one to survive in the long run.
Before presenting our main results, it is worth mentioning a remark regarding the complete network. In a complete network, each agent is able to observe actions and realized payoffs of every other agent, i.e., N i = N for all i ∈N. If the network is complete, then it will converge to a monomorphic steady state from the second period on. Namely, everyone else in the second period will imitate the agent who received the highest payoff in the first period, leading to the disappearance of all alternative actions. The probability of two actions giving exactly the same payoff is equal to zero, because of the assumptions regarding the continuity of payoff functions' distributions.
Obviously, the simple case mentioned above does not ensure neither the convergence to a steady state, nor that this steady state needs to be monomorphic. The following proposition establishes the fact that if the system reaches a steady state, then it must be the case that all the agents choose identically. Formally, The proof (which can be found in the appendix) is very intuitive. The idea is that when more than one actions are still chosen, there must exist at least one pair of neighbors choosing different actions. Hence, each one of them faces a strictly positive probability of choosing a different action in the next period. This ensures that at some period in the future, at least one of the two will change her action, meaning that the population is not in steady state. The above proposition is in line with the work of Gale and Kariv (2003) , where identical agents end up making identical choices in the long run. Notice that the result is no longer valid if the network becomes arbitrarily large (see Example 4.4 -Two Stars). Nevertheless, we have not ensured yet the convergence of the population to a steady state, but only the fact that if there exists a steady state, then it has to be monomorphic. In principle, all monomorphic states are possible steady states.
In the following theorem we provide the first main result of the paper, which is that any arbitrary network, with finitely many agents, who behave under "imitate-the-best rule," converges to a monomorphic steady state. The intuition behind our result is captured by the following three lemmas, which are also used for the formal proof (all proofs can be found in the appendix).
Lemma 3.1 Consider an arbitrary connected network with finite population, where more than one action is observed. Each period t, every action α k ∈A t faces positive probability of disappearing after no more than d N periods.
The main idea behind this lemma is that every action is vulnerable to a sequence of negative shocks to the payoffs of its adopters (agents who are currently choosing the action). Regardless of the number and the position of those agents, the probability of disappearance after finitely many periods is strictly positive.
Lemma 3.2 Suppose that K-1 actions have disappeared from the network until period t. Then, there is strictly positive probability that exactly K actions will have disappeared from the network after a finite number of periods τ.
This result is a direct implication of Lemma 3.1. Its importance becomes apparent if we notice that an action that disappears from the population (not chosen by any agent at a given period) never reappears. τ can take different values depending on the structure of the network and the initial conditions, but it is always bounded above by the diameter of the network d N . There are many possible histories that lead to convergence to a monomorphic state. Some of them lead to the disappearance of one action every τ = d N periods, which is an intersection of events with strictly positive probability of occurring, as shown in Lemma 3.2. By Lemma 3.3 we know that convergence will occur with strictly positive probability after a finite number of periods. Analogously, convergence will not occur in the same number of periods with probability bounded below 1. The probability that convergence never occurs is given by the infinite product of probabilities strictly lower than one, therefore convergence to a monomorphic steady state is guaranteed in the long run. The corollary is apparent from the fact that even the optimal action faces a positive probability of disappearance as long as there are more actions chosen in the network. This result points out a weakness of this updating mechanism, which is the inability to ensure efficiency. However, if the population is arbitrarily large, then we provide sufficient conditions for the diffusion of the optimal action (see Section 4).
Experimentation
Although we have shown that all monomorphic states are steady states, this does mean that they are all equally plausible. It is important to discuss whether they are robust to small mutations and experimentations. Recall that one of the crucial features of our mechanism is that once an action disappears from the network it never reappears. Obviously, if we introduce forms of experimentation that preserve this feature, then the result will still hold. For example, we could transform the updating rule as follows: In each period, each agent imitates her most successful neighbor with probability (1-ε) ∈(0, 1) and with probability ε imitates at random another of the actions she observed in the previous period (including her own current choice). Under this revised updating rule, the result remains the same, with a slight modification in the lower bound of Lemma 3.1 which should be multiplied by | |
(1 ) .
ε − However, one might find this definition of experimentation rather unusual. For this reason, we focus on the standard form of experimentation where in each period, each agent imitates her most successful neighbor with probability 1-ε and with probability ε chooses at random among all the available actions. Applying the results of the seminal article by Fudenberg and Imhof (2006) we obtain the following two results. First, we show that the process will be almost always nearby one of the monomorphic states. Notice that, under this form of experimentation actions that have disappeared can reappear in the population. This means that there is no convergence to a steady state in the sense that we have defined it earlier, i.e., there is no state such that if the process reaches it, then stays there forever. Second, we describe an algorithm that calculates how much time the process is expected to spend in each of the monomorphic states. In fact, we observe that the process spends a non-negligible amount of time in each one of them. 21 Fudenberg and Imhof (2006) observe that as long as the probability that a single mutant invades the population is O(ε), while the probability that two or more mutants invade simultaneously is o(ε), then the process will spend 1 -O(ε) of the time at the steady states 22 of the unperturbed process, which are the vertices of the state space, O(ε) of the time on the edges of the state space and o(ε) at the interior points. In our case, the set of steady states coincides with the set of monomorphic states and it is easy to see that the present form of experimentation verifies the above stated condition. Therefore, if the rate of experimentation is small then the process will be almost always nearby one of the monomorphic states.
21 Usually, such states are called stochastically stable (see Ellison 2000) . Therefore, using this terminology, we could say that in the main theorem we have proven that the set of monomorphic states coincides with the set of absorbing states and in this section we show that all monomorphic states are also stochastically stable. 22 Mentioned by the authors as absorbing states.
Moreover, the current process verifies the assumptions of theorem 2 of Fudenberg and Imhof (2006) . This theorem provides an algorithm that calculates how much time the perturbed process is going to spend in each one of the steady states of the unperturbed process. The three conditions that are sufficient to verify the assumptions of the theorem are the following: (i) The fact that our form of experimentation satisfies the conditions defined in the previous paragraph,
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(ii) our Theorem 3.1, in which we show that the set of steady states of the unperturbed process coincides with the set of monomorphic states and (iii) the fact that a single mutation can cause a transition from any steady state to any other. 24 Intuitively, the result states that it is sufficient to calculate the invariant distribution of a Markov matrix over the monomorphic (absorbing, in general) states where the probability of a transit from the state where "all choose A" to the state where "all choose B" is the transition probability from the state where "all but one choose A and one chooses B" to the state where "all choose B". 25 It is important to notice that the process will spend a non-negligible amount of time in each one of the monomorphic states. The following example illustrates the result we just described. 23 For expositional reasons we use Assumptions 3 and 4 of Fudenberg and Imhof (2006) , which are more intuitive and which combined imply Assumption 8 that is used in the proof of theorem 2. 24 As an attempt to keep notation simple, we do not define the arguments and assumptions of the theorem formally. We refer the reader to the original article for the formal analysis. 25 Whenever possible we adopt the exact terminology of the original paper, in order to facilitate the reader. ( 1) 1 1 , ,
It is important to mention what would happen under the presence of experimentation if instead of assuming random and independently distributed payoffs we had assumed the payoffs to be deterministic. First of all, it is obvious that without experimentation (and assuming the initial state to contain all the actions of the action space) the process would converge to the monomorphic state where all the agents choose the optimal action. The reason is that the optimal action would always yield higher payoff than any other action, therefore every agent would switch to the optimal action after observing it for the first time and would stick to it from that period onwards. The result would not change if we add experimentation, but let the experimentation rate go to zero. Proving this would be a direct application of theorem 1 of Ellison (2000) (Simple Radius -Coradius Theorem). This becomes clear if we observe that in the unperturbed process all the non-monomorphic states where at least one agent chooses the optimal action lie in the basin of attraction of the monomorphic state where everyone chooses the optimal action. However, if we assume the experimentation rate to be bounded away from zero, the process will enter a chaotic phase where all actions will be present but most of the agents will be choosing the optimal action. Intuitively, the dynamics of the process will be the following. On the one hand, there will be a natural tendency of the process towards the monomorphic state where everyone chooses the optimal action. On the other hand, the more agents choose the optimal action, the larger the number of them that will experiment by choosing an alternative action. The exact proportions would be hard to determine because they depend both on the experimentation rate and on the exact network structure.
Concluding, despite the fact that experimentation allows the reappearance of actions that have disappeared, we have shown that if the experimentation rate is low then the process will be almost always nearby one of the monomorphic states. Moreover, interestingly enough, the amount of time that the process will spend in each one of the monomorphic states is going to be strictly positive. Therefore, although we expect the process to spend more time at the monomorphic state where everyone chooses the optimal action, it need not be the case that this will be observed infinitely more often than the rest of the monomorphic states.
Probabilistic Updating
Our results still hold if we relax the assumption that all the agents update their choices in every period and introduce probabilistic updating. Formally, suppose that in every period there is a positive probability, r > 0, that an agent will decide to update her choice. The proof is identical to the one of Theorem 3.1, if we multiply the lower bound of I is the cardinality of the set of agents choosing action α k in period t. Hence, the network converges with probability one to a monomorphic steady state, although convergence may occur at a slower rate.
Networks with Arbitrarily Large Population
In this section, we consider an arbitrarily large population N. Formally, what we mean is a sequence of networks
where every agent i of the n-th network is also an agent of the (n+1) -th network, and moreover any pair of agents i, j of the n-th network are connected if and only if they are connected in the (n+1) -th network. Roughly speaking, that would mean that the (n+1) -th network of the sequence would be generated by adding one extra agent to the n-th network. Notice that, every countably infinite network can be obtained as the limit of such a sequence. Henceforth, with a slight abuse of notation, we write n→∞.
Before we begin our analysis we need two definitions. First, we say that an action is used by a non-negligible share of the population if the ratio between the number of agents choosing this action and the size of the population does not vanish to zero, as n becomes arbitrarily large. Formally, if { :
= is the set of agents who choose α k at period t as n→∞, then: At first glance, one could doubt whether there is a difference between the cases of finite and arbitrarily large networks. Throughout this section we show, why the two cases are indeed different. Intuitively, we expect different behavior, since for arbitrarily large networks there must exist actions chosen by a nonnegligible share of the population and for each of these actions, the probability of disappearance in finite time vanishes to zero.
Moreover, the possibility that some agents may be connected with a nonnegligible share of the population makes them really crucial for the long-term behavior of the society. This is a property that changes the results of our analysis, even between different networks with arbitrarily large population. For this reason, we introduce the following assumption. (Keep in mind that the following assumption is used only when it is clearly stated.)
Notice that, Assumption (1) does not hold if there exists an agent who affects a non-negligible share of the population. In the rest of the section, we compare the cases where Assumption 1 holds or does not hold, while stressing the conditions that make the results of Section 3 fail when the population becomes arbitrarily large.
Bounded Neighborhoods
In this part we assume that Assumption (1) holds. The main importance of this assumption is that it removes the cases where an agent can affect the behavior of a non-negligible share of the population.
For an arbitrarily large network, an obvious, nevertheless crucial, remark is that there must be at least one action chosen by a non-negligible share of the population. Our analysis will be different when there is exactly one such action and when there are more. The result of the above proposition is quite intuitive. If an action is chosen by a non-negligible share of the population and also each agent can affect finitely many others, then the probability that this action will disappear in a finite number of periods vanishes to zero. However, this is not the case for the rest of the actions, which face a positive probability of disappearance. Hence, no other action can survive in the long run. Nevertheless, Proposition 4.1 covers only the cases where there exists only one such action.
The question that follows naturally is whether the network has the same properties when more than one actions are diffused to a non-negligible share of the population. For a general network and payoff structure, the answer is negative. The negative result is supported by a counter example. More formally, consider a network with arbitrarily large population behaving under "imitate-the-best" rule and having bounded neighborhoods. Then, if there are more than one actions chosen by a non-negligible share of the population, we cannot ensure convergence to a monomorphic steady state, without imposing further restrictions to the network or/and payoff structure. 27 Moreover, the only agents who may change their choice are those located in the boundary between the groups using each action, i.e., agents 0 and 1 in period t = 1. This boundary will be moving randomly in the form of a random walk without drift. With probability 1 1 4 4       it will be moving one step to the left (right) and with probability 1 2 it will be staying at the same position. By standard properties of random walks, this boundary will never diverge to infinity, therefore the network will never converge to a monomorphic steady state. In fact it will keep fluctuating around zero, without ever reaching a steady state. The negative result of the previous example does not allow us to ensure convergence to a steady state under every network structure, when at least two actions are chosen by a non-negligible share of the population. However, there exist sufficient conditions, related to the payoff and network structure, which can ensure it.
In the following proposition, we consider the case where all the agents have bounded neighborhoods and that all the remaining actions are chosen by nonnegligible shares of the population. Under these conditions, we show that an action can be diffused to the whole population as long as it is sufficiently more likely to be successful than any other action. We focus on the case where there is no aggregate shock for each action (U AC (a, z) = 0 for all a ∈A and for all z ∈Z),
Figure 3 Probability density functions of utilities for α 1 and α 2 .
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( ) ( ) Notice that D is an exponent of F.
Our sufficient condition is stronger than first order stochastic dominance; nevertheless we have the advantage of providing a result adequate for every network structure. The important fact in our proof, is that the agents changing to α k are, in expectation, more than those changing from α k to some other action. In general, this condition may depend not only on the payoff structure and the initial share, but also on the network structure, which is something we completely disregarded in the present analysis. Nevertheless, this result can become the benchmark for future research on stronger conditions for specific structures.
It is somehow surprising that a condition as strong as first order stochastic dominance may not be sufficient. This happens either because of the complexity of the possible network structures, or because of insufficient initial share of the action of interest. To clarify this argument, we construct the following example. 
Unbounded Neighborhoods
In this section we drop the assumption of neighborhoods being bounded. This means that as n grows, there exists at least one agent whose neighborhood grows as well without bounds. If neighborhoods are unbounded, we cannot ensure convergence to a monomorphic steady state, even when the diameter of the network is finite. This happens because a single agent can affect a non-negligible share of the population, meaning that in one period an action can be spread from a finite number of agents to a non-negligible share of the population. This means that we will have more than one action chosen by a non-negligible share of the population, which may lead the network not to converge to a monomorphic state. We clarify the above statement with the following example (Example 4.3). Moreover, in case of unbounded neighborhoods, it does not hold anymore the result of Proposition 3.1, based on which the steady state has to be necessarily monomorphic. We provide another example where a network is in steady state and there are two actions present (Example 4.4). We have shown that, without restricting the neighborhoods to be bounded we cannot ensure convergence to a steady state. In the following example, we show that when the neighborhoods are unbounded a network can be in steady state without this being monomorphic. This is in contrast to Proposition 3.1, where we have shown that for finite population, steady states are necessarily monomorphic. For arbitrarily large population, this need not be the case. As n grows, the neighborhoods of the central agents grow without bounds. They get connected with more and more agents choosing the same action as them and only one choosing differently. Hence, the probability that they will change action goes to 0, as n goes to infinity, hence they will continue acting the same, with probability one. 29 The peripheral agents have only one neighbor each, who always chooses the same action as them; so none of them will change her action either. Concluding, this network will be in a steady state where half of the agents choose each action.
The intuitive conclusion of this observation is that groups of agents who choose the same action and communicate almost exclusively between them can ensure the survival of this action in the long run, since no agent of this group ever changes her choice.
Conclusion
We study a model of observational learning in social networks, where agents imitate myopically the behavior of their most successful neighbor. We focus on identifying if an action can spread to the whole population, as well as the conditions under which this is possible. Our analysis reveals the different properties between finite and arbitrarily large populations.
For networks with finite population, we show that the network necessarily converges to a steady state, and this steady state has to be monomorphic. However, we cannot ensure which action will be the one to survive. This reveals the vulnerability of small populations to misguidance that can lead to the diffusion of sub-optimal actions. Furthermore, an action's performance in the initial periods, is crucial for its survival, since a sequence of negative shocks in early periods can lead to early disappearance of the action from the population. Moreover, despite the fact that we focus on connected networks, our analysis would be identical for connected components of disconnected networks. In that case, different actions would survive, one per each component. This raises the issue that a potential explanation for the survival of different actions in different parts of societies may be due to lack of communication between them.
The results differ when the population is arbitrarily large. Under the assumption of bounded neighborhoods, an action is necessarily diffused, regardless of its efficiency, only when it is the only one to be chosen by a non-negligible share of the population. When more such actions exist, we provide a sufficient condition in the payoff structure, which can ensure convergence regardless of the network architecture. The general idea behind this result is that the diffusion of an action in a very large network is quite hard and requires either very special structure, very large proportion of initial adopters, or an action to yield higher payoffs much more often than the others.
Our sufficient condition is valuable mostly in networks where the largest neighborhood has a very small size. This increases the importance of studying the role of network architecture, rather than the payoff structure, when applying to networks where agents have large neighborhoods. The advanced complexity of this problem, makes it hard to deal with its general version. A very interesting and natural extension of the present paper would be to study different payoff structures in specific networks with importance in applied problems.
The role of central agents becomes apparent when we drop the assumption of bounded neighborhoods. Even an action initially chosen by a single agent can survive in the long run, if this agent is observed by a non-negligible share of the population. This stresses the influential power of massively observed agents in a society. Affecting the decision of a very well connected agent can become very beneficial for its diffusion.
In the present paper, we have studied some important properties of an "imitate-the-best" mechanism in a social network. However, crucial questions remain to be answered. Specifically, our analysis refers only to long-run behavior, without mentioning anything regarding neither the speed of convergence, nor the finite time behavior of the population. Different network structures are expected to have much different characteristics, leaving open space for future research. 
(respectively, U AC ) associated with action α k , for k = 1, 2. Therefore, after each period, agent i has strictly positive probability p of changing her action. The probability that she will never change, given that no other agent in the network does so, is zero, because: . This is because all the shocks are independent across periods. Let k t D α denote the event that, starting from period t, action α k will disappear in the next d N periods. One of the possible histories that leads to disappearance of action α k is the consecutive realization of the events C t+τ for τ ≥ 0, until all the agents who were using α k at t have changed their choice, while no other agent has adopted it. The number of periods needed depends on the structure of the network. More specifically it is at most equal to the diameter of the network, which cannot be greater than n-1.
The formal reasoning that proves the above argument is as follows. After a sequence of realizations {C } for τ consecutive periods, all the agents who, in period t, were contained in t k I and whose distances from t k F were at most τ-1, will not be contained in . However, if the state is not monomorphic then the maximum distance between any node 30 We define the distance between a node i and a set of nodes J as the minimum distance between i and some node j ∈J. 
where M is the total number of possible actions. Namely, the above expression tells that the probability of exactly one more action disappearing in the next τ periods equals the sum of probabilities of disappearance of each action, subtracting the probability that more than one them will disappear in the given time period. Analogously: Notice, as well, the importance of the assumption for bounded neighborhoods. If this did not hold, then we could not ensure that the above product would be strictly positive. Moreover, the expression does not hold for the action α k . The bounded neighborhoods' assumption can hold only if the diameter of the network grows without bounds as n grows. Given that α k is the only action chosen by non-negligible share of the population, L k must also grow without bounds. Hence, for any finite number of periods τ there exists n large enough, such that action α k faces a zero probability of disappearance before period t+τ. More intuitively, this happens because in each period, all the agents choosing a different action combined can affect the choice only of a finite number of other agents. Therefore, it is not possible that a non-negligible share of the population will stop choosing α k in a finite time period.
Subsequently, the result of Lemma 3.2 still holds, with some appropriate modification. Namely τ = L and [ | With similar reasoning, we get the modification of Lemma 3.3, which tells that there is positive probability of convergence to a monomorphic steady state in finite time, given that action α k will not disappear. But, this is equivalent to the case where every agent chooses action α k , denoted as {CA k }. Formally,
